Strategy-proof and envyfree random assignment
Fichiers
Date de publication
Autrices et auteurs
Identifiant ORCID de l’auteur
Contributrices et contributeurs
Direction de recherche
Publié dans
Date de la Conférence
Lieu de la Conférence
Éditeur
Cycle d'études
Programme
Mots-clés
- Random assignment
- Strategy-proofness
- Envyfreeness
- q-unanimity
Organisme subventionnaire
Résumé
We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is strategy-proof, envyfree and unanimous. Then we weaken the latter requirement to q-unanimity: when each agent ranks a different object at the top, then any agent shall receive his most preferred object with probability of at least q. We show that if a mechanism satisfies strategyproofness, envyfreeness, ex-post weak non-wastefulness, ex-post weak efficiency and q-unanimity, then q must be smaller than or equal to 2 |N| (where |N| is the number of agents). We introduce a new mechanism called random careless dictator (RCD) and show that RCD achieves this maximal bound. In addition, for three agents, RCD is characterized by the first four properties. JEL Classification: D63, D70.