Two-stage majoritarian choice
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Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.
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- Majority rule
- Decisiveness
- IIA
- Monotonicity
- Rational shortlist methods
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Abstract
We propose a class of decisive collective choice rules that rely on an exogenous linear ordering to partition the majority relation into two acyclic relations. The first relation is used to obtain a shortlist of the feasible alternatives while the second is used to make a final choice. In combination with faithfulness to the underlying majority relation, rules in this class are characterized by two desirable rationality properties: Sen’s expansion consistency and a version of Manzini and Mariotti’s weak WARP. The rules also satisfy natural adaptations of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives and May’s positive responsiveness.
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