On the constrained efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
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Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques.
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- Random assignment
- Strategy-proofness
- Ex post efficiency
- Bounded invariance
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We study random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. Random Serial Dictatorship is known to be only ex-post efficient and there exist mechanisms which Pareto-dominate it ex-ante. However, we show that there is no mechanism that is likewise (i) strategy-proof and (ii) boundedly invariant, and that Pareto-dominates Random Serial Dictatorship. Moreover, the same holds for all mechanisms that are ex post efficient, strategy-proof and boundedly invariant: no such mechanism is dominated by any other mechanism that is likewise strategy-proof and boundedly invariant.
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